Just because a company has used its name to identify its products, does not give the common law trademark a secondary meaning sufficient to win a UDRP fi=or a Complainant.
In the new case of Liverpool Lumber Co., Inc. and Joseph Ehle v. RESCUECOM, found here:
<a href=’http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1389956.htm’ target=’_blank’>, decided by Beatrice Onica Jarka, the Complainant asserted that it acquired common law rights for services of sale, distribution and installation of windows, doors, cabinetry, interior and exterior fabrications and other lumber related products and related design services. The evidence brought by the Complainant to support this assertion referred to the date of creation of the business back in 1940s, the advertisement and the sales under the alleged mark level of $8 million per year. However, none of the evidence brought, refers to the use of mark LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC in connection to certain services, but to the name of the company LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC selling these services. Moreover, after performing its own search on internet, the Panel found that no reference is made to LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC as a mark for certain services but to LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC as a company name with contact data delivering such services. It is also, the opinion of the Panel, that the Complainant failed to show that its alleged LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC mark has become a distinctive identifier associated with the Complainant or its goods and services.”
It is interesting that the Panelist did her own independent research on this case instead of limiting her knowledge to the facts presented by both parties.
Of course, that led to the conclusion that the Complainant did not establish secondary meaning to its common law marks and therefore the CLAIM WAS DENIED.
Thanks for listening,
Howard
The Neu Facebook
